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Abstract
Australia’s ability to meet its commitment to reduce greenhouse gases under the
Kyoto convention will probably require at least some government intervention.
Traditionally, approaches to reducing pollution in Australia have tended to
focus on the adoption of emission standards. Theoretical criticism by
environmental economists has, in part, resulted in a movement toward the
adoption of market based mechanisms for pollution abatement; and flirtations
with carbon taxes and tradeable permits to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Each instrument is subject to significant weaknesses. Tradeable permits are
administratively complex for both polluter and administrator and can lead to
production bottlenecks where polluters cannot find requisite permits. A carbon
tax is simpler to administer and offers much more flexibility, but can have
regressive and inequitable economic impacts. Of these approaches, tradeable
permits offer greater potential for achieving set emissions reductions, but tend to
be restricted in application to large emitters such as industry. It is argued here
that to be truly cost effective, incentives to reduce emissions need to be targeted
as close as possible to the point of fuel consumption—and hence greenhouse
emission: by both industry and the household consumer. This paper explores
the benefits and limitations of adopting a mixed incentive scheme applied to the
energy consumer to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The proposed consumer
carbon reduction incentive (CBCRI) incorporates elements of tradeable permits,
carbon taxes and emission reduction subsidies.
5INTRODUCTION
Although the protracted debate over global warming and the likely impact of
greenhouse gases continues, the Kyoto convention represents an
acknowledgment of the importance of the greenhouse issue. The convention
resulted in participating countries committing to reductions of projected
greenhouse emissions. In terms of policy, this has shifted the emphasis from
determining how much should be abated to what approaches should be adopted
to achieve set emissions for each participating country, including Australia.
In recent years, debate regarding suitable mechanisms for reducing pollution
has progressed from the adoption of regulatory approaches such as standards to
economic instruments such as pollution taxes and tradeable permits. Given the
pervasiveness and importance of fossil fuel use, which produce a significant
proportion of greenhouse emissions, the choice of instrument is critical. Apart
from an ability to deliver results, other important considerations include cost,
equity and political acceptability of any proposed measure. Analysis of
commonly proffered instruments reveals that each have their strengths and
weaknesses.
Another dimension to the choice of instrument is the targeting of such
instruments and who should bear the cost of abatement. Provisionally, a least
cost approach requires that all emissions sources should abate to a level
commensurable with their abatement costs—both industrial and household.
However, while tradeable permits are most desirable in many respects, it is not
administratively possible to apply on such a broad scale. Alternatively, carbon
taxes are much simpler, but are undesirable on other grounds.
This paper proposes another possibility, coined under the name Consumer-
Based Carbon Reduction Incentives (CBCRI). CBCRI is a mixed instrument
applied at the level of energy consumer whereby individuals are allocated a
proportion of a total greenhouse emission target and subjected to a tax or
subsidy depending on whether their emission exceed or fall below their
permitted levels.
 The paper proceeds with an outline of existing policy instruments, and their
strengths and weaknesses. This is followed by an investigation of mixed
schemes. The merits of applying such a scheme at the level of energy consumer
6is then explored under the rubric of a CBCRI scheme. The paper then goes on to
briefly consider the economic, equity and political impact of this approach in
contrast to existing instruments.
A SURVEY OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS FOR REDUCING
GREENHOUSE GASES
In view of the Kyoto protocol, which requires that Australia contain the growth
in its forecast greenhouse emissions at a predetermined level, it is arguable that
in order to comply it will be necessary to implement some form of regulatory
framework. Such a regulatory scheme might take the form of the imposition of
an abatement or technological standard, or cooperative emission reduction
targets, which are the traditional approach to pollution abatement (James, 1990).
Certainly such an approach has the advantage of transparency and
comprehensibility which, if properly enforced, leads to a predetermined
outcome (Berttram, 1992,p.432).
However, it has been well established that uniform regulatory approaches are
unsatisfactory, at least from a theoretical perspective. The most common
criticism of the imposition of regulatory standards is that the marginal cost of
abatement is not uniform across all polluters, therefore with a standard an
efficient outcome will not be achieved and there will be a loss in welfare
(Baumol and Oates, 1988, p.188; Russel, 1981, p.24). The result will be a high cost
to the community and economic inefficiency (James, 1990, p.l7). Uniform
standards are also criticised for their inflexibility in the face of changing
circumstances such as economic growth, requiring regulators to be constantly
rewriting the rules, which is generally politically unacceptable (Baumol and
Oates, 1979, p 2 ; Russel, 1990, p.24). Regulation can be a sound approach where
the environmental costs are considerable, highly inelastic and well known-such
as in the case of lead in petrol (see Pearce, 1990). However, the greenhouse issue
is characterised by a great degree of uncertainty as to the damage function of
greenhouse gases. Further, regulation provides little incentive for individuals or
firms to develop innovative technologies, which reduce abatement costs, since
there is no economic gain in doing so (Russel, 1990).
Market based approaches to pollution abatement are a commonly proffered
solution to the optimality, or cost issues associated with standards. These
approaches usually fall under the rubric of pollution charges (taxes) or tradeable
7emission permits. Both approaches have their strengths as well as weaknesses.
While a carbon tax spreads the cost of pollution abatement evenly among
polluters, they are criticised for their potential to impair economic growth (see
DASETT, 1991, pp.23-35). A more significant criticism is their uneven impact on
welfare depending on socioeconomic status (see OECD 1995). Moreover, a
carbon tax does not guarantee significant reductions in greenhouse emissions
(Burgess, 1990).
Tradeable emission permits, on the other hand, are better suited for achieving
set emission reduction targets, since they specify a permissible aggregate level
of pollution (Kling, 1994). However, although a permit scheme appears to be the
better of the existing policy options for achieving specified greenhouse emission
targets, other significant problems are encountered. One of the most significant
of these is administrative.
A trading scheme is plausible where there are a small number of polluters
involved, but administrative complications increase by orders of magnitude
when pollution sources are diffuse—as they are in the case of greenhouse
emissions. Practical issues emerge even where there are relatively few polluters,
as evidence from the United States suggests. Problems which detract from such
schemes include ‘thin markets’, high transaction costs and hoarding of permits
which have considerably reduced the potential advantages of a permit system in
terms of cost savings (Hahn and Hester, 1989a; Hahn and Hester, 1989b).
Another issue is objection to tradeable permits on the grounds of an ideological
position that ‘property rights’ to pollution should be not be countenanced at all-
particularly where rights are given to large industries (Steidlmeier, 1993; Owen,
1991, p.4). Many such objectors believe such a scheme detracts from air being a
common property resource to which all have equal rights of access. Right or
wrong, the inclusion of certain sections of the polluting community and not
others does raise an important questions regarding the targeting of greenhouse
policy instruments, on the basis of both rights and efficiency.
Targeting of Instruments at all Fuel Consumers
In terms of targeting instruments for abating greenhouse emissions, two
important criteria apply. To be effective targeting should:
81) directly impact on the point of emission—that is, at the point of fuel or
energy consumption; and
2) be spread across all sources of emission such that the abatement costs
are equal at the margins.
Together, these two points suggest that minimising the cost of greenhouse
abatement measures requires that all polluters—industrial and household—
contribute to greenhouse reductions according to their ability to abate. As such,
the use of economic approaches applied to industrial sources, while an
improvement on standards, are flawed because they do not target the entire
spectrum of final energy consumption. In general, where possible, a
decentralised market-based approach is desirable for the reduction of
greenhouse gases (Hahn, 1995).
To date, greenhouse reduction initiatives that have been countenanced in
Australia which do impact household consumption do so only indirectly. Such
measures are principally aimed at increasing fuel efficiency—through producing
fuel efficient cars, energy efficient appliances and so on (see Wilkenfeld, 1995).
Instead of achieving a desired target, these indirect approaches could actually
result in increased emissions because improvements in efficiency are offset by
increasing household consumption if there is no direct incentive for them to
reduce emissions, according to the second criteria above (Tietenberg, 1995,
pp.19-20).
Targeting instruments at the whole spectrum greenhouse sources, and at the
point of consumption enhances the ability to achieve desired abatement targets.
Further, such an approach provides a strong incentive for technological
innovation without the need for regulatory prescription where consumer
demand for energy efficient products increases in response to a strong enough
incentive (Wilkenfeld et al., 1995, p. 17). However, of the instruments outlined so
far, a carbon tax is the only instrument which can feasibly be applied across the
spectrum of greenhouse emitters, but is undesirable on a number of other
grounds. In view of this it is worth exploring other possibilities.
MIXED INSTRUMENTS
 The bulk of the literature on greenhouse abatement has tended to focus on
standards versus economic instruments; and, within  the latter, carbon taxes
9versus tradeable permits (see Tisdell, 1993; Kling, 1994a; Biglaiser et al., 1995).
However other possibilities do exist which combine these approaches. One
alternative to standards, taxes or permits involves a mixture of all three. Roberts
and Spence (1976) have suggested such a scheme. Their ‘mixed incentive
scheme’ operates much like a tradeable permit scheme, with the added
flexibility for polluters to exceed or fall short of permit quotas if required by
circumstances. Where polluters who exceed their entitlements they are subject to
a tax for each addition unit of emission. Conversely, those polluters who do not
use all their entitlements are reimbursed via a subsidy for each unit of excess
allocation. This mixed approach introduces flexibility such that firms are not
locked into specific emission targets where there is uncertainly as to abatement
costs or private benefits such that they do not possess the ‘optimal’ allocations
required to minimise cost or maximise profit.
Target Setting Under a Mixed Incentive Scheme
In the case of reducing greenhouse emissions, where a specific abatement target
is already established, using a mixed incentive scheme the parameters can be set
such that an incorrect estimation of the marginal net private benefit (MNPB)
function will still allow a target to be reached . This is illustrated in Figure 1.
From the figure, the curve MNPB1 designates the marginal net private benefit
curve anticipated by the regulator. Po is the existing level of emissions which the
regular seeks to reduce to Pt. A charge c is applied to emissions that exceed a
ceiling and a subsidy s is given with respect to those which fall below. For
MNPB1 the optimal tax for a carbon tax scheme is represented by p, which, is
also the price for emission permits under a permit trading scheme allocating Pt
permits.
10









A mixed scheme, such as that proposed by Roberts and Spence (1979), reduces
transaction costs while still approaching an outcome of a tradeable permit
system, provided the change and subsidy are set such that:
s <p <c
where
s  is the level of subsidy, or rebate per unit of emissions produced
under allotted allocations;
p is the price of permits that would have been attained via the market
mechanism; and
c is the charge applied to each unit of emission beyond the acceptable
level.
Roberts and Spence (1976, pp. 193) argue that this mixed approach can
potentially provide a ‘once and for all’ solution to an emission problem. This is
because even if the initial parameters—number of permits, level of charge and
level of subsidy—are set incorrectly, the result should still approximate an
optimal solution. This mixed approach reduces the chances of having to make
iterative changes to accommodate miscalculations and changed circumstances.
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From Figure 1 it can be seen that if regulators miscalculate the position of the
benefit curve, or if this curve shifts due to long-term adjustments to a tax
scheme, to either MNPB2 or MNPB3, the target reduction should still be
achieved. Thus adopting a mixed approach significantly reduces the
informational requirements of regulators. As such, the cost of the required level
of information for this type of scheme is far less prohibitive than alternative
policy options of a carbon tax or permit system (Roberts and Spence, 1979, pp.
196-200).
CONSUMER BASED CARBON REDUCTION INCENTIVES
A feature of Roberts and Spence’s (1976) mixed approach is the significant
reduction in transaction costs and flexibility for polluters to choose not pursue a
requisite number of permits through the market system. Given this flexibility,
there is an emerging possibility to apply such a scheme to diffuse sources of
greenhouse gases at the household level—where it is otherwise not possible for
a tradeable permit scheme. One such a scheme is coined here as consumer based
carbon reduction incentives (CBCRI).
In terms of achieving prescribed emission reduction targets, a CBCRI scheme
involves the setting of a target as part of an overall strategy for reducing
greenhouse emission from energy use. Such a target can take a number of forms.
While a uniform target reduction across all emissions is conceptually simplest,
for reasons which will be outlined below, targets can be differentiated between
types of use—commercial and household, for example. Different emitters can
then be further differentiated on a sector-by-sector basis, for which existing
administrative regimes are responsible for administering—a transport authority
for transport emissions, energy authority for energy emissions, and so on. These
sectors would reflect major categories of greenhouse emissions, such as
transport and electricity generation for which a separate greenhouse emission
reduction target is set.
Emission rights are then allocated to consumers such that the sum of allocation
is equal to the abatement target for that sector. Such allocations could be pro
rata, but there would be a good case for differentiating allocations between
consumers on the basis of economic impact. In terms of household consumers,
which is the main focus of discussion here, allocations could also be
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differentiated on the basis of other considerations such as income inequality or
regional considerations—such as rural versus urban fuel consumption.1
Implementing CBCRI
Once a specific target is set, the main administrative consideration for the
implementation of a CBCRI scheme is the setting of the levels of tax and subsidy.
This task could become much simpler in view of emerging possibilities for
international trading of greenhouse emissions, which are the focus of discussion
below. Where a CBCRI scheme coexists with international trading, the market
price of permits provides a value of the parameter p which will help guide the
setting of the other parameters. The relationship between tax, subsidy and price
has already been identified above.
Caution would need to be exercised in view of fluctuating world prices for
emissions permits. Any fluctuations in price which fall outside the level or tax or
subsidy would tend to undermine the effectiveness of a CBCRI scheme, unless
transaction costs are low enough to induce trading—an option unlikely to be
feasible at the household level. As a general rule, the difference between tax and
price and price and subsidy would need to be big enough to cover
administrative costs.2
Tracking Emissions
The most expensive aspect of a CBCRI scheme is likely to be the tracking and
verification of emission levels of millions of individual consumers. With the use
of emerging technologies, and integrating a CBCRI scheme with the existing tax
system, it could be possible to reduce administrative costs to level low enough
to make such a scheme feasible.
                                                
1 However, any differentiation needs to be weighed up against the administrative cost which it
would then create.
2  However, it is worth noting that as the difference between these parameters grows, the scheme
begins to adopt more closely the dimensions of a regulatory approach—that is, an effective
standard which is very expensive to exceed, and little incentive to abate below—with its inherent
drawbacks discussed above. The challenge then is to keep the administrative costs down to
preserve the market characteristics of the scheme as far as is possible.
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One way of achieving this could be using smart cards. With the adoption of
smart cards capable of storing up to 16,000 characters of information regarding
consumer transactions it would be possible to store information about fuel
consumption by type of fuel (Choice,1996). Depending on the type of card used,
there is no need for the information to be stored centrally (Choice, 1996). In the
case of transport, information regarding fuel use, which is converted into carbon
equivalents depending on the type of fuel used, could be stored on the card at
the pump . Incentive to participate in the scheme is provided by charging the
full tax rate when a purchaser does not present a smart card, effectively acting as
a carbon tax for non-participants. Those who participate are exempted from the
tax so long as their cards still retain a surplus level of emission permits. The
repayment of subsidies could be integrated with the existing tax system, such
that a receipt for surplus allocations from a card reader is submitted as part of a
yearly tax statement.
An Integrated Approach to Greenhouse Abatement
While it has been mentioned that mixed incentives can be used to provide a
‘once and for all’ approach which tend to provide a predetermined outcome this
is not automatically the case there the MNPB curve fluctuates wildly, or the
difference between charge and subsidy are relatively small. In figure 1 above it
can be seen that if the charge was set lower than shown, or the subsidy set
higher, then the MNPB2 and MNPB3 cases would result in surplus emissions
and permits respectively. At the aggregate level, such a scenario will result in
either exceeding or falling short of the desired abatement target.
However, in view of emerging possibilities for an international permit trading
scheme, the above outcome does not preclude achieving a target in effect, if not
in fact, through the trading of permits internationally, or even nationally at the
sectoral level. Where a specified target has been exceeded, if the initial
parameters are correctly set, the revenue collected would more than offset the
cost of buying additional permits to cover the abatement shortfall. (Revenue
could also be funnelled into forestry as a carbon sink which would, in turn, be
used as an emission credit.3) The same is true where surplus permits are sold to
                                                
3 The economics of offsetting greenhouse emissions from transport with forest plantations have
been investigated the Bureau of Transport and Communication Economics (BTCE, 1996).
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fund the payment of subsidies. This is shown in figure 2. Figure 2A shows the
case where net emissions exceed the target Pt  to the level Pa. In figure 2B the
achieved emission level Pb is better than the target level such that surplus
allocations are available. The cost of buying permits, or paying the subsidy is
shown by the hatched areas in both figures while surplus revenue is shown is
shown in the dark area.









ANALYSIS OF CONSUMER BASED CARBON REDUCTION
INCENTIVES
Attention is now turned to analysing the implications of implementing a CBCRI
scheme. This is done with a view to the effectiveness of a the scheme and its
ability to achieve prescribed targets, economic impact, equity and redistributive
impacts and the likely political reaction to such a proposal. The analysis
compares the scheme to command-and-control and market-based incentives
such as a carbon tax or a pure permit scheme.
Effectiveness of a CBCRI scheme
 A CBCRI scheme is not as reliable in achieving desired emission objectives as
tradeable emission permits or command-and-control because it does not lock
polluters into meeting established targets. However, it is far more desirable on
other grounds, not least of which is the major problem of enforcement which
accompany regulatory-based schemes and the administrative problems
associated with a tradeable permit scheme.
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A CBCRI scheme should provide a much stronger incentive to reduce emissions
than a carbon tax, which simply raises costs irrespective of the level of emissions
produced and simply becomes a part of a range of taxes and charges applied to
fuels. A feature of adopting a mixed approach combining a subsidy and a tax for
different levels of emissions is that the cost functions of consumers are not linear,
as it is in the case of a carbon tax. Instead, there is a change in costs at the
threshold level of emissions.
The effectiveness of a CBCRI scheme would be enhanced with a permit trading
scheme at the national or international level. As discussed above, the scheme can
readily be integrated with permit trading and remain revenue positive.
 Economic Impact of CBCRls
Depending on the form in which it is implemented, a CBCRI scheme appears to
involve a smaller net burden on economic activity and conform to conditions of
optimality better than either a carbon tax or a permit system alone. The principal
reasons are threefold. First, for those who participate, a CBCRI scheme should
involve a lower tax burden then under a carbon tax, since charges only apply
once allocations have been exceeded.
Second, a CBCRI scheme provides flexibility in response to changing economic
circumstances. It would avoid potential bottlenecks associated with tradeable
permits if polluters were not able to obtain permits due to market rigidities and
transaction costs. Any policy which produces bottlenecks in production and
consumption will have a deleterious economic impact which may exceed the
benefits of that policy (Koutstaal and Nentjes, 1995). Mixed instruments such as
CBCRIs provide an escape route whereby polluters who exceed allocations are
subject to a tax instead of having to search out additional permits to purchase.
While there are a number of other approaches available to overcome permit
supply bottlenecks - such as overlapping permit systems, leasing arrangements,
and extending permit life - they are administratively complex (Grubb and
Sebenius, 1992).
Finally, while a CBCRI scheme introduces flexibility, it retains the stabilising
influence typical of tradeable permit schemes on energy prices. A sudden
increase in energy prices and a consequent fall in fuel consumption, may be
compensated for either as an increase in the level of total rebate, or a reduction
in total tax for excess emissions. An important issue, discussed above, is the
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desirability for differentiation between types of fuel users to minimise the
economic impact of the scheme—between commercial and private users, for
example. This is administratively possible since the proposed CBCRI scheme is
integrated with the tax system, which is already geared up for differentiation on
this basis and others such as income and location. Similarly, the distribution of
permits can be tailored according to the same principles.
 Equity and Redistributive Implications
A carbon tax has been found to entail a significantly higher burden on low
income earners compared to high income earners (OECD, 1995). This finding has
been confirmed by a number of studies—although the level of impact depends
on whether changes in income or in expenditure are used to determine impacts
(Hamilton and Cameron, 1994; OECD, 1995, p. 21 ).
Unlike carbon taxes, the net distribution of revenue from a CBCRI scheme is
from high to low emitters of C02, not from low to high income earners. While
further analysis is needed to determine the precise distributional impacts in
specific cases, it is plausible that the distributional impacts of a CBCRI scheme
will be lower than that of a carbon tax alone. Should the distributional impacts
be significant, the parameters of a CBCRI scheme can be tailored to minimise
these in much the same way as for economic reasons discussed above.
Distributional impacts aside, other equity implications of the scheme are
favourable. The potential for payment to those who do not exceed their
allocation of carbon emissions is an important aspect of CBCRI. In this sense the
scheme satisfies the strong Pareto criterion because those who choose not to
produce emissions are compensated via the rebate mechanism by those who
pollute (Layard, 1972, p.16).
Political Acceptability a CBCRI Scheme
Another important consideration is the political acceptability of a CBCRI
scheme. One consideration that often impedes the popularity of tradeable
emission permit systems or Pigouvian taxes is inequitable distribution of costs
(OECD, 1995, p. 7; Becker and Shechter, 1996, p.10). A CBCRI scheme is less
likely to have significant redistributive impacts than a tax, and as such would be
seen to be more acceptable. Further, the potential for compensation will provide
a strong level of support for those who stand to gain from such a proposal.
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Those who will be encumbered with the tax might more readily accept a CBCRI
than a carbon tax alone because it will only be applied once the quota of
emissions is exceeded. Assuming that the tax on excess emissions is no greater
than for a carbon tax, the cost of the scheme for those fuel consumers is less
because the additional tax only applies to a part of their fuel consumption.
 A mixed scheme such as CBCRI is likely to prove more popular than a pure
tradeable permit scheme with those environmentalists who oppose the
allocation of property rights to pollute for two reasons. First, rights are
consigned to individuals rather than companies. Second, those rights are not
‘pure property’ in the sense that they can be bought and sold. There may still
remain problems resistance to the scheme by the public who perceive it as
another bureaucratic imposition, but the ability of the scheme to fit within
existing administrative regimes will help with the adoption process.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has proposed CBCRI as an alternative instrument for reducing
greenhouse gas emissions to commonly proffered approaches such as
regulation, taxes and tradeable permits. CBCRI is a mixed incentive scheme,
which incorporates elements of tradeable permits with taxes or subsidies
applied to emissions which exceed or fall short of allocated or acquired emission
rights.
The CBCRI scheme discussed here in has focussed on its application across the
spectrum of energy users, both household and firm—with emphasis on the
former, given its neglect under alternative proposals. A CBCRI scheme could
operate concurrently with an international tradeable permit scheme where
emission permits are bought and sold collectively by the administering
authority to supplement allocated emission targets for a sector, or to pay for
subsidies where a particular target has been exceeded. In each case there should
be a surplus of revenue to cover the administrative costs of the scheme.
However, these costs need to be kept to a minimum to maximise the scheme’s
economic benefits. It is plausible that costs could be significantly reduced by
adopting smart card technology and streamlining a CBCRI scheme into the
existing tax system
Analysis of CBCRI reveals that it potentially captures the advantages of
tradeable permits, by facilitating the meeting of abatement targets, while
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reducing its administrative and transaction costs. While it is flexible, it avoids
the worst redistributive effects of a carbon tax, and reduces the overall tax
burden associated with a level of tax required to achieve a substantial level of
abatement. Further, it is democratic in nature, by allocating emission rights
across the population; and satisfies the strong Pareto principle, by charging
polluters and compensating pollutees. It is also argued here that such a scheme
is likely to meet less political resistance than its existing counterparts.
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